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Peter Verniero is automatically substituted as a party plaintiff for 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
Karen Alexander, Dennis Drazin, Esq., and the lawfirm 
of Drazin and Warshaw, P.C., appeal from the district 
court's dismissal of their complaint under Fed R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). Plaintiffs had alleged that New Jersey's Wrongful 
Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 et seq., and Survival Action 
Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3, violate the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution because they deny a cause of 
action to the statutory beneficiaries unless a fetus survives 
past birth. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and will 
affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint. 
 
I. FACTS  
 
On July 15, 1992, Karen F. Alexander, who was then 
eight and one-half months pregnant, was admitted to the 
Jersey Shore Medical Center to give birth to her child. The 
vital signs of Ms. Alexander's baby were taken only fourteen 
minutes prior to delivery by cesarean section, and the fetus 
appeared normal and healthy. Tragically, however, the child 
was stillborn.2 
 
An autopsy was performed, and a death certificate was 
issued showing the date of the child's birth as July 15, 
1992. The birth certificate noted the child's name was 
Kaylyn Elissa Alexander and that she was "stillborn" due to 
"cardio-vascular collapse." 
 
On July 13, 1994, Karen Alexander filed a complaint in 
the Superior Court of Monmouth County, New Jersey, 
seeking damages individually3 and in her capacity as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment states that the child died 
"while she was still in her mother's womb and before her actual birth, 
and was therefore declared `stillborn'." Joint Appendix, at 37. The 
hospital's records state that the child had "interpartum demise." Id. 
 
3. In the state court action, Karen Alexander seeks recovery in her 
individual capacity for the emotional distress and mental suffering which 
resulted from the stillbirth allegedly caused by the medical malpractice 
of the defendants. 
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Administratrix Ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Kaylyn 
Elissa Alexander, Deceased, under the New Jersey Wrongful 
Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1, and as General Administrator 
of the Estate of Kaylyn Elissa Alexander, Deceased, under 
the New Jersey Survival Action statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3. 
The complaint alleged that the negligence of doctors, 
nurses, and other health care personnel at Jersey Shore 
Medical Center had injured Ms. Alexander's baby while it 
was still in her mother's womb. Ms. Alexander requested 
that the Surrogate of Monmouth County issue Letters of 
Administration Ad Prosequendum and General Letters of 
Administration for the Estate of Kaylyn Elissa Alexander. 
On October 18 and 31, 1994, the Surrogate denied the 
request for Letters Ad Prosequendum because Kaylyn Elissa 
had been stillborn. 
 
On October 28, 1994, Karen Alexander and Dennis 
Drazin, a New Jersey lawyer, and Drazin & Warshaw, P.C., 
a law firm, filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey. The suit named Christine Todd Whitman, 
individually, and as Governor of the State of New Jersey, 
Deborah T. Poritz, individually, and as Attorney General of 
the State of New Jersey,4 and the Surrogates of all twenty- 
one counties in New Jersey as defendants. Alexander 
brought the action individually, on behalf of all mothers 
whose fetuses had allegedly been injured in utero by the 
tortious acts of a third party and who were later stillborn, 
on behalf of her own stillborn child, and on behalf of all 
stillborn children who were similarly situated. The 
complaint alleged violations of the Equal Protection and 
Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Essentially, the complaint alleged the New Jersey Wrongful 
Death Act (as interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988)), and the 
New Jersey Survival Action Act are unconstitutional 
because they deny recovery on behalf of stillborn fetuses. 
Plaintiffs requested, inter alia, that these statutes be 
declared unconstitutional, an order directing the surrogate 
to issue letters of administration in the estate of Kaylyn 
Elissa Alexander to Karen Alexander, and money damages. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See n. 1, supra. 
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Drazin and Drazin & Warshaw, P.C., individually and on 
behalf of all attorneys and law firms (the "Drazin 
plaintiffs"), raised the same constitutional challenge to the 
statues, and alleged that their constitutional rights are 
violated because they are precluded from bringing wrongful 
death and survival actions on behalf of potential clients 
whose children were stillborn because of the tortious acts 
of third parties. 
 
On December 11, 1995, the Governor and the Attorney 
General (the "State defendants") filed a motion to dismiss 
the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Surrogates 
(the "County defendants") thereafter moved to join in the 
state defendants' 12(b)(6) motion. Plaintiffs then cross- 
moved for class certification and for summary judgment. 
 
Subsequently, fifteen of the Surrogates executed Consent 
Orders of Judgment.5 Following argument, the district court 
granted the State defendants' motion to dismiss. 
Consequently, plaintiffs' motions for class certification and 
for summary judgment were denied. This appeal followed.6 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court's order 
dismissing a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Moore 
v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993). We must 
determine if plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any 
reasonable reading of the pleadings, Holder v. City of 
Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1993), assuming the 
truth of all the factual allegations in the complaint. D.R. v. 
Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 
1364, 1367 (3d Cir. 1992). A court may dismiss a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. By those Consent Orders, the fifteen Surrogates agreed not to file any 
further submissions opposing the factual and legal contentions of the 
plaintiffs and agreed to be bound by all future interlocutory and final 
orders of the district court. (112A-147A). 
 
6. Plaintiffs' section 1983 complaint sought money damages (Count V) 
and declaratory and injunctive relief (Counts I, II, III and IV). However, 
plaintiffs are not appealing the district court's dismissal of their 
complaint as it relates to their claim for money damages. See Notice of 
Appeal (Joint Appendix, at 148). 
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complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted 
under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with 





A. THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
 
It is helpful to briefly discuss the two causes of action at 
issue in this dispute before proceeding with our analysis. 
 
1. WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION. 
 
The fundamental purpose of a wrongful death action is to 
compensate survivors for the pecuniary losses they suffer 
because of the tortious conduct of others. Alfone v. Sarno, 
403 A.2d 9, 12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), modified 
on other grounds, 432 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1979). This cause of 
action was not recognized at common law and is purely a 
creature of statute. Schmoll v. Creecy, 254 A.2d 525, 527 
(N.J. 1969). New Jersey's Wrongful Death Act provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
 
 When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful 
act, neglect or default, such as would, if death had not 
ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain 
an action for damages resulting from the injury, the 
person who would have been liable in damages for the 
injury if death had not ensued shall be liable in an 
action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the 
person injured and although the death was caused 





7. Our standard of review on an appeal from a denial of summary 
judgment is plenary, Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 728 (3d Cir. 1990), 
and our review of class certification determinations is normally limited to 
whether the district court abused its discretion. Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 
975 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1992). However, because we find that the 
district court's dismissal of the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
was proper, we need not address the propriety of its denial of plaintiffs' 
motions for summary judgment and for class certification. 
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An award of damages in a wrongful death action "is not 
a matter of punishment for an errant defendant or of 
providing for decedent's next of kin to a greater extent than 
decedent himself would have been able, but is rather a 
replacement for that which decedent would likely have 
provided and no more." Hudgins v. Serrano, 453 A.2d 218, 
224 (N.J. App. Div. 1982). The amount of recovery is based 
upon the contributions, reduced to monetary terms, which 
the decedent might reasonably have been expected to make 
to his or her survivors. Alfone, 402 A.2d at 12. Damages 
are awarded for pecuniary loss only, and not for injury to 
feelings, mental suffering, or loss of society or 
companionship. Id. However, economic dependency is not 
the sole measure of the damages. Minor children may 
recover the pecuniary value of the loss of care, guidance 
and advice of a parent during their minority. Id. In addition, 
the wrongful death statute permits the award of hospital, 
medical and funeral expenses. N.J.S.A. 2A:31-5. 
 
A wrongful death action is available when a child is killed 
by the tortious act of another. 
 
 When parents sue for the wrongful death of a child, 
damages should not be limited to the well-known 
elements of pecuniary loss such as the loss of the value 
of the child's anticipated help with household chores, 
or the loss of anticipated direct financial contributions 
by the child after he or she becomes a wage earner. . . . 
[I]n addition, the jury should be allowed, under 
appropriate circumstances, to award damages for the 
parents' loss of their child's companionship as they 
grow older, when it may be most needed and valuable, 
as well as the advice and guidance that often 
accompanies it. 
 
Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 211 (N.J. 1980). However, 
damages for these additional items are confined to their 
pecuniary value, not including the value of the emotional 
loss. Id. 
 
Damages for the wrongful death of an infant are likewise 
recoverable and, "like wrongful-death damages generally, 
are limited to economic matters[ ] [such as] . . . the 
pecuniary value of the child's help with household chores, 
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the pecuniary value of the child's anticipated financial 
contributions, and the pecuniary value of the child's 
companionship . . . as the parents grow older." Carey v. 
Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1291 (N.J. 1993)(citing Green, 424 
A.2d at 211). However, "[t]he problem in evaluating the 
economic value of a newborn's life is obvious. No one can 
know much, if anything, about the infant and his or her 
future economic worth. That difficulty, however, should not 
preclude any award. Some award is appropriate even 
though the inferences, and estimate of damages, are based 
on uncertainties." Carey, 622 A.2d at 1291. 
 
The particular aspect of New Jersey's wrongful death 
action that gives rise to the instant controversy arises from 
the holding in Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 
1988). There, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
New Jersey Wrongful Death Act does not permit recovery 
for damages attributable to the wrongful death of a fetus. 
However, even though the parents cannot recover for the 
death of the fetus in such cases, they can recover damages 
for their own injuries that result from the tortious conduct. 
"[M]edical malpractice causing an infant stillbirth 
constitutes a tort against the parents, entailing the direct 
infliction of injury, their emotional distress and mental 
suffering, for which they are entitled to recover 
compensatory damages." Id. at 139. 
 
2. SURVIVAL ACTION. 
 
At common law, a right to bring an action in trespass 
was personal and died with the person. Canino v. New York 
News, Inc., 475 A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. 1984). Accordingly, 
survival actions, like wrongful death actions, did not exist. 
Soden v. Trenton and Mercer County Trust Co., 127 A. 558, 
559 (N.J. 1925). Survival action statutes modify the 
common law rule and provide that the personal right of 
action in trespass survives to the personal representative of 
the decedent's estate. Id., at 559. 
 
New Jersey's Survival Action statute provides as follows: 
 
 Executors and administrators may have an action for 
any trespass done to the person or property, real or 
personal, of their testator or intestate against the 
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trespasser, and recover their damages as their testator 
or intestate would have had if he was living. 
 
 In those actions based upon the wrongful act, 
neglect, or default of another, where death resulted 
from injuries for which the deceased would have had a 
cause of action if he had lived, the executor or 
administrator may recover all reasonable funeral and 
burial expenses in addition to damages accrued during 
the lifetime of the deceased. 
 
N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3. A survival action "gives executors or 
administrators a right of action for tortious injury or 
damage to the deceased or his property incurred prior to 
death." Alfone, 403 A.2d at 13. The major item of damages 
in a survival action (aside from funeral and burial 
expenses) is recovery for the decedent's pain and suffering 
between the time of injury and the time of death. However, 
an award for pain and suffering is appropriate only for pain 
and suffering that is conscious. Id. Recovery is also 
permitted for "hedonic damages," i.e., loss of enjoyment of 
life. Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 658 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991). 
 
The court in Giardina did not address rights of recovery 
on behalf of stillborn children under New Jersey's survival 
action. However, the district court here found that "it is 
clear by the implications of the holding in Giardina and by 
the language of the survival action statute itself that the 
New Jersey Legislature did not intend to provide the 
parents of unborn or stillborn fetuses with a statutory 
cause of action for survival." Dist. Ct. Op. at 13. Neither 
party to this appeal disagrees with that portion of the 
district court's holding, and we will therefore assume that 
New Jersey's survival action, like the wrongful death action, 
is limited to situations where the fetus survives until after 
birth. 
 
B. KAREN ALEXANDER'S CLAIM ON BEHALF OF HER 
CHILD AND ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED 
STILLBORN FETUSES. 
 
Ms. Alexander asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on 
behalf of her stillborn child, Kaylyn Elissa, and all stillborn 
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children and fetuses, alleging that the exclusion of stillborn 
children and fetuses from the coverage of New Jersey's 
wrongful death and survival actions violates the United 
States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant 
part: 
 
 Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
. . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "is not itself a source of 
substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal 
rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United 
States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). 
 
Ms. Alexander's claim on behalf of her stillborn child is 
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which provides that: "No State shall .. . deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.8 In essence, Ms. 
Alexander argues that her stillborn child was a "person" 
who is denied the equal protection of the law because, 
under New Jersey law, wrongful death and survival actions 
can be maintained on behalf of children who are injured 
prenatally, are born and then die as a result of the prenatal 
injury, whereas, under New Jersey law, wrongful death and 
survival actions cannot be maintained on behalf of stillborn 
children. 
 
However, Ms. Alexander can only establish a claim on 
behalf of her child under the Fourteenth Amendment if her 
child (and others similarly situated) fall(s) within the 
protections afforded "person[s]" as that term is used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and it is clear it does not. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Our discussion of the claim brought on behalf of the stillborn child 
assumes that Karen Alexander has standing to assert the claim. 
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Supreme Court has already decided that difficult question 
for us in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). There, the 
Court expressly held that "the word `person,' as used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn." The 
Court held that "person" has "application only postnatally." 
Id. at 157. That constitutional principle was more recently 
re-affirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). There, 
Justice Stevens, writing separately from the joint opinion of 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, wrote that, as a 
matter of federal constitutional law, a fetus is a "developing 
organism that is not yet a `person' " and"does not have 
what is sometimes described as a `right to life.' " Id. at 913 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
This principle "remains a fundamental premise of our 
constitutional law governing reproductive autonomy." Id. at 
914. Since the unborn are not persons within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, no claim alleging an equal 
protection violation can be brought on behalf of the 
stillborn child.9 
 
Of course, as noted above, our inquiry must accept all 
well pleaded facts as true and we note that the complaint 
avers that the stillborn child was a human being from the 
moment of conception.10 However, even if that is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Because the unborn are not persons within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it follows that the unborn are not encompassed 
within the meaning of the term "person" or"citizen" for purposes of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. See Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127-28 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
 
10. In ¶ 40 of the complaint it is averred that: 
 
As a matter of fact a child at every age of gestation from conception 
to birth is a complete, separate and irreplaceable human being and 
the daughter of Karen F. Alexander and all mothers similarly 
situated are actual human beings who have relationships with their 
mothers carrying them. This relationship between these two 
separate, complete individual human beings is in actual existence 
throughout pregnancy. As a matter of fact, a child can experience 
pain beginning at eight weeks after conception up to the time of 
actual birth. As a matter of fact, Karen F. Alexander's baby daughter 
and all children similarly situated from ages eight weeks after 
conception experience pain and suffer during trauma or as a result 
of injury or the damage to bodily systems necessary for the 
continuance of the life of the child. 
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established as a matter of fact, we must look to controlling 
law to determine what effect, if any, that fact has upon our 
analysis. Our inquiry is not a factual one. It is a legal one. 
The question is not whether a stillborn child is a human 
being from the moment of conception, but whether that 
unborn "human being" is included within the meaning of 
"person" contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. That 
legal question was resolved over twenty-four years ago 
when the Supreme Court decided Roe. In fact, the Court 
there specifically differentiated between the factual inquiry 
into when life begins, and the legal issue of the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated: 
 
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life 
begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines 
of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to 
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in 
the development of man's knowledge, is not in a 
position to speculate as to the answer. 
 
410 U.S. at 159. Thus, it is immaterial that the complaint 
pleads that a stillborn child is a human being from 
conception. 
 
Plaintiffs' reliance upon the advances of medical 
technology is likewise beside the point. Plaintiffs contend 
that Roe was based in part upon limited medical and 
scientific knowledge and that technological advances since 
Roe was decided allow us to study human development 
from the molecular stage. In fact, plaintiffs claim that the 
Roe Court provided for an evolving jurisprudence to keep 
pace with the state of medicine and science when it wrote 
"the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's 
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the 
answer" to the question of when human life begins. See 
Appellants' Brief, at 41-42. However, no advance in 
technology or science can authorize us to depart from well 
established legal precedent, and we do not believe the 
Supreme Court intended to grant a license to do so in Roe. 
 
Similarly, plaintiffs' reliance on what they believe to be an 
essential underpinning of the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
decision in Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960), 
does not make the constitutional claim raised on behalf of 
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the stillborn child a cognizable one. In Brennan, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that children who survive a 
prenatal injury can bring a cause of action in tort against 
the person who caused the prenatal injury.11 The court 
explained its holding by noting that "[m]edical authorities 
have long recognized that a child is in existence from the 
moment of conception, and not merely a part of its mother's 
body."12 Id. at 502. 
 
The plaintiffs attempt to leverage this language by 
arguing that the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized 
as scientific fact that an unborn child is a human being 
from the moment of conception. However, even assuming 
the court has recognized this as fact, it does not follow that 
that court has also recognized the unborn child to be a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Smith v. Brennan overruled Stemmer v. Kline, 26 A.2d 489 (N.J. 
1942), which did not allow a surviving a child a cause of action in tort 
for prenatal injuries. Stemmer v. Kline declined to recognize a cause of 
action for prenatal injury based, in large part, upon Dietrich v. 
Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am.Rep. 242 (Sup. Jud. 
Ct. 1884), which was a wrongful death case where the child was 
apparently stillborn. Dietrich held that Massachusetts' wrongful death 
statute was inapplicable to a fetus, based on its view that a child is part 
of its mother before birth and does not have a separate existence or 
personality. 
 
12. Perhaps realizing the import of its holding that a child is in existence 
from the moment of conception, the New Jersey Supreme Court qualified 
its language. The court wrote: 
 
 The semantic argument whether an unborn child is a "person in 
being" seems to us to be beside the point. There is no question that 
conception sets in motion biological processes which if undisturbed 
will produce what every one will concede to be a person in being. If 
in the meanwhile those processes can be disrupted resulting in 
harm to the child when born, it is immaterial whether before birth 
the child is considered a person in being. And regardless of 
analogies to other areas of the law, justice requires that the 
principle be recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life 
with a sound mind and body. If the wrongful conduct of another 
interferes with that right, and it can be established by competent 
proof that there is a causal connection between the wrongful 
interference and the harm suffered by the child when born, damages 
for such harm should be recoverable by the child. 
 
Smith, 157 A.2d at 503. 
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"person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, even 
if it had, it should be clear that no such holding could 
contravene or reverse the contrary holding of the United 
States' Supreme Court. Quite simply, a state cannot 
"declare a fetus a person" and thereby add "new persons 
to the constitutional population." Ronald Dworkin, 
Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be 
Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV . 381, 400. In addition, Smith 
was decided on common law principles and created a 
common law remedy for a surviving child harmed by a 
prenatal injury. No federal constitutional principles were 
implicated in that court's analysis. 
 
The short answer to plaintiffs' argument is that the issue 
is not whether the unborn are human beings, but whether 
the unborn are constitutional persons.13  It is beyond 
question that medical and scientific knowledge has 
advanced significantly since Roe. However, even with those 
advances, the Supreme Court has consistently adhered to 
Roe's holding that the unborn are not persons under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. at 855-61. Therefore, 
plaintiffs' argument that Roe was based on imperfect 
science is to no avail.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The phrase "constitutional person" is Ronald Dworkin's. Ronald 
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be 
Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV . 381, 398. 
 
14. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, clearly acknowledged the advances in medical 
knowledge since Roe. She wrote: 
 
"We have seen how time has overtaken some of Roe's factual 
assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for abortions 
safe to the mother later in pregnancy than was true in 1973, and 
advances in neonatal care have advanced viability to a point 
somewhat earlier. But these facts go only to the scheme of time 
limits on the realization of competing interests, and the divergences 
from the factual premises of 1973 have no bearing on the validity of 
Roe's central holding, that viability marks the earliest point at which 
the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify 
a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions. 
 
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 860 (citations omitted). 
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Accordingly, the district court properly granted a 12(b)(6) 
dismissal of the equal protection claim raised on behalf of 
the stillborn child. 
 
C. KAREN ALEXANDER'S CLAIM ON BEHALF OF 
HERSELF AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED 
MOTHERS. 
 
Besides asserting a claim on behalf of her stillborn child, 
Karen Alexander asserts a claim on her own behalf and on 
behalf of all mothers whose children were stillborn because 
of the tortious conduct of others. She claims that her 
interest in her relationship with her unborn child during 
pregnancy is a fundamental interest protected by the 
United States Constitution and that the challenged statutes 
violate both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
1. THE DUE PROCESS CLAIM. 
 
The Due Process Clause not only requires that the 
government follow appropriate procedures when it seeks to 
"deprive any person of life, liberty or property," it also 
prevents "certain government actions regardless of the 
fairness of the procedures used to implement them." 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Thus, the 
Due Process Clause has a substantive component which 
guarantees that "all fundamental rights comprised within 
the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution 
from invasion by the States." Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. at 847 (quoting 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)(Brandeis, 
J., concurring)). 
 
Although the "outer limits of the substantive sphere of 
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects" have not 
been defined, Id., at 848, certain protected liberties fall 
within the ambit of protection. Thus, those to whom the 
Amendment applies have a right to be free 
 
from bodily restraint but also the right . . . to contract, 
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to 
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home 
and bring up children, to worship God according to the 
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dictates of [their] own conscience[s], and generally to 
enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential 
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 
In addition, the Constitution "promise[s] .. . that there is 
a realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 
505 U.S. at 847. The result is a right of "personal privacy, 
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy[.]" Roe, 
410 U.S. at 152. The rights included within that zone are 
deemed "fundamental" and include "activities relating to 
marriage", "procreation", "contraception", "family 
relationships" and "child rearing and education." Id. at 152- 
53. They therefore involve "the most intimate and personal 
choices" a person can make in his or her lifetime. They 
include "choices central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 
"The first step in any substantive due process review is to 
determine the standard of review." Sammon v. New Jersey 
Bd. of Med. Exam's, 66 F.3d 639, 643-44 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Ms. Alexander argues that we must give these New Jersey 
statutes strict scrutiny because they impact upon a 
woman's "relationship" with an unborn fetus, and that 
relationship is within this protected zone of privacy 
included in the substantive component of the Due Process 
Clause. 
 
Where fundamental rights or interests are involved, a 
state regulation limiting these fundamental rights can be 
justified only by a compelling state interest and legislative 
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the 
legitimate state interests at stake. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 
(citations omitted). Therefore, state limitations on a 
fundamental right such as the right of privacy are 
permissible only if they survive strict constitutional 
scrutiny. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 929 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting)(citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
485 (1965)). However, where fundamental rights or 
interests are not implicated or infringed, state statutes are 
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reviewed under the rational basis test. That is "the test 
traditionally applied in the area of social or economic 
legislation." Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting)(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 
483, 491 (1955)). Under rational basis review, "a statute 
withstands a substantive due process challenge if the state 
identifies a legitimate state interest that the legislature 
could rationally conclude was served by the statute." 
Sammon, 66 F.3d at 645. 
 
Ms. Alexander argues that her relationship with her 
unborn child during pregnancy is itself a fundamental 
interest, and that these statutes should receive strict 
scrutiny because they impact upon that relationship. 
However, we need not now determine whether a mother's 
relationship with her unborn child during pregnancy is a 
fundamental interest because the New Jersey statutes at 
issue here do not affect Ms. Alexander's relationship with 
her unborn child. A mother's relationship with her fetus is 
exactly the same whether or not she can bring a wrongful 
death or survivor action. It is not the relationship that is 
affected here, it is the ability to recover for the loss of that 
relationship. 
 
Neither the Wrongful Death Act nor the Survival Action 
Act interfered with any decision Karen Alexander made or 
might have made about her stillborn child. It is impossible 
for us to imagine that any such decision would be the least 
bit influenced by whether or not a mother could bring a 
wrongful death or survival action to recover damages for 
the loss of a fetus. Ms. Alexander's assertion of a 
constitutionally impermissible interference with a 
fundamental interest is grounded in her argument that 
stillborn children and fetuses are being denied the 
protection of New Jersey's tort law. The purpose of those 
laws, she argues, "is the deterrence of conduct which 
injures and kills others, and the promotion of caution to 
protect health and life." Appellants' Brief at 4. The denial of 
the tort law's protection is alleged to be the resulting 
infringement upon her fundamental interest in her 
relationship with her stillborn child. Appellants' Brief at 32. 
 
However, that argument misstates the reality of New 
Jersey's tort law system. The wrongful death and survival 
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statutes do preclude Ms. Alexander from instituting certain 
kinds of law suits on her own behalf, and on behalf of her 
unborn child. However, she is not being denied the 
protection of the state's tort law. She has a tort remedy and 
that remedy is a common law cause of action to recover for 
emotional distress and any injury to herself when medical 
malpractice causes the stillbirth of a baby. 
 
 The gravity of such negligence, the foreseeability of 
parental suffering, and the genuineness of injury and 
loss present a compelling case for recognition of the 
direct injury to the parents. 
 
 . . . We thus conclude that the wrong committed by 
a doctor in negligently causing the pre-birth death of 
an infant constitutes a tort against the parents. 
 
Giardina, 545 A.2d at 141-42. Thus, contrary to Ms. 
Alexander's assertions here, Giardina did not leave 
pregnant women defenseless against negligence that results 
in the death of a fetus. In fact, that court began its analysis 
noting: "[b]y recognizing such a cause of action [in tort] we 
protect the interests affected by the tortious conduct 
resulting in the death of an infant before birth." Id. at 139. 
Those are the same interests that are implicated by 
wrongful death and survival actions. Id.15 
 
Karen Alexander also relies heavily upon Levy v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), its companion case, Glona v. 
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), and 
Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
However, those cases addressed the constitutionality of 
legislative enactments that discriminated against persons 
on the basis of having been born out of wedlock. They did 
not implicate substantive due process. Instead, they were 
equal protection challenges to statutory classifications. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We do not mean to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
a state to provide a tort remedy for prenatal injuries. Indeed, that 
assertion is endemic in Ms. Alexander's attempt to fashion a Due 
Process right from New Jersey's purported failure to protect her fetus 
from the negligence of health care providers. Rather, we mention the 
aspects of tort law that serve to protect her own bodily integrity, and the 
health of the fetus, to illustrate the weakness in her argument. See 
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), infra. 
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Levy invalidated the provisions of a state statute that 
excluded illegitimate children from the class of children 
entitled to recover for a parent's death under Louisiana's 
wrongful death statute and Glona involved the same 
statute's exclusion of a mother from recovering for the 
wrongful death of her illegitimate son. Weber invalidated 
the provisions of Louisiana's workman's compensation 
statute which excluded unacknowledged illegitimate 
children from recovering for the death of their wage-earner 
father. 
 
In deciding Levy, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
illegitimate children's right to recover "involve[s] the 
intimate, familial relationship between a child and his own 
mother," Levy, 391 U.S. at 71. That recognition informed 
the decisions in Glona and Weber. However, the interest at 
issue in each of those cases was the classification of the 
child's legitimacy, "and the inability of both parent and 
child to reverse the burdens imposed by illegitimacy." 
Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-24, at 
1554 (2d ed. 1988). The cases were not decided upon the 
basis of the family relationship as Ms. Alexander argues. In 
Parham v. Hughes, the Court explained the basis of Levy 
and its progeny. 
 
The basic rationale of these decisions is that it is 
unjust and ineffective for society to express its 
condemnation of procreation outside the marital 
relationship by punishing the illegitimate child who is 
in no way responsible for his situation and is unable to 
change it. 
 
441 U.S. at 352.16 
 
In Parham, the Court upheld a Georgia statute that 
restricted the class of persons who were entitled to bring 
wrongful death actions to recover for the death of an 
illegitimate child. Under that statute, only the mother, and 
those fathers who had legitimated the child in the manner 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Ms. Alexander criticizes the district court for relying upon Roe while 
not even citing Levy. See Appellant's Br. at 40. However, it is easy to 
understand why the district court did not cite Levy, Glona, or Weber. 
Those cases are simply not relevant to the issues raised here. 
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prescribed by statute, could file suit. The plaintiff was the 
father of an illegitimate child whom he had not legitimated. 
The father had, however, signed the child's birth certificate 
and had contributed to the child's support. When the child 
and its mother were killed in an auto accident, the father 
brought a wrongful death action in state court. The 
defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds 
that the applicable statute precluded the suit because 
plaintiff had not legitimated the child, but the trial court 
denied the motion on the grounds that the statute violated 
both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. On 
appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, and the 
Supreme Court thereafter accepted the appeal from that 
decision to decide "whether [the] statutory scheme violates 
the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by denying . . . the right to sue for 
the child's wrongful death." Id. at 349. The Court refused to 
apply the heightened scrutiny it had applied in Weber, and 
upheld the statute using the "rational means" test, and the 
concomitant presumption of validity. The Court reasoned 
that the classification established under the statute was a 
rational means of limiting tort claims, as well as false 
claims of paternity. The Court focused primarily upon the 
classification, and did not base its analysis upon whether 
the statute deprived plaintiff of a fundamental right noting 
-- in passing -- "[i]t can not seriously be argued that a 
statutory entitlement to sue for the wrongful death of 
another is itself a `fundamental' or constitutional right." Id. 
at 358. Ms. Alexander's Equal Protection and Due Process 
claims must fail for the same reason. The statutes do not 
interfere with her relationship with her fetus as she claims, 
nor do they interfere with a fundamental right. 
 
Parents do, of course, have a fundamental liberty interest 
in the care and custody of their children, Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Lehr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983)("[T]he relationship of 
love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in 
liberty entitled to constitutional protection."). Moreover, 
there is an intense emotional bond consisting of the great 
joy and hope that naturally develops between a mother and 
the child she is carrying in her womb. Indeed, it is the 
awareness of the reality and intensity of the mother-fetal 
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bond which apparently led the New Jersey Supreme Court 
to create a parental right of recovery for the emotional 
distress suffered by the parents when medical malpractice 
causes a stillbirth. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 140. 
 
Karen Alexander's actual complaint is with the tort 
remedy that New Jersey has provided. She would prefer to 
be able to institute a wrongful death and survival action, 
either in lieu of, or in addition to, the tort remedy first 
recognized in Giardina v. Bennett.17 Since there are rather 
severe limitations on the emotional distress that one can 
recover for under Giardina, the concern is that the mother 
of a stillborn will not be able to show the degree of severity 
necessary to recover, in spite of the fact that negligence and 
causation are shown. However, the fact that a mother may 
not be able to prove the degree of emotional distress 
necessary to recover in a given case does not mean that 
mothers whose children are stillborn because of the 
tortious conduct of others are denied the protection of New 
Jersey's tort law. 
 
Since New Jersey has not infringed upon any relationship 
Ms. Alexander had with her stillborn infant, this 
substantive due process claim does not merit strict scrutiny 
review. Accordingly, we inquire only to see if it is a rational 
means of achieving a legitimate state interest. When 
subjecting a state statute to rational basis review,"a court 
. . . is not entitled to second guess the legislature on the 
factual assumptions or policy considerations underlying the 
statute." Sammon, 66 F.3d at 645. The only inquiry 
permitted "is whether the legislature rationally might have 
believed that the predicted reaction would occur or that the 
desired end would be served." Id. It is up to the person 
challenging the statute to "convince the court that the 
legislative facts on which the classification[of the statute] 
is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. To prove a claim for emotional distress caused by the tortiously- 
caused death of a fetus, "the mother must prove that she suffered 
emotional distress so severe that it resulted in physical manifestations or 
that it destroyed her basic emotional security." Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 
1279, 1288 (N.J. 1993). "The worry and stress . .. [attendant] upon the 
birth of every child will not suffice. Nor will the upset that every parent 
feels when something goes wrong in the delivery room." Id. 
 
                                22 
true by the governmental decisionmaker." Id. at 645-46 
(quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)). A 
statute "withstands a substantive due process challenge if 
the state identifies a legitimate state interest that the 
legislature rationally could conclude was served by the 
statute." Id. at 645. 
 
One cannot seriously argue that New Jersey has no 
interest in defining who is entitled to recover for injuries 
and in setting limits on tort recovery for wrongful death. 
The requirement that the child on whose behalf a wrongful 
death and survival action is instituted have been born alive 
is rationally related to that interest. New Jersey has chosen 
to draw a bright line that eliminates the nearly impossible 
problems of proof inherent in such actions when injury to 
a fetus is at issue. Absent the limitation in these statutes 
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prohibit a 
wrongful death or survival action no matter how early the 
fetus was in its development. This would mean that one 
could recover if it could be established that a zygote would 
have developed had not an alleged tortfeasor injured a 
developing fertilized egg seconds after the union of sperm 
and egg. Although a state could permit recovery for an 
injury to that which would later develop into a fetus, it is 
certainly not required to do so under the Due Process or 
Equal Protection Clauses. Limiting such actions in the 
manner that New Jersey has chosen is both reasonable and 
practical. Ms. Alexander argues that including stillborn 
children and fetuses within the coverage of wrongful death 
and survival actions would not harm New Jersey's 
legitimate interest in setting limits on tort recovery. She 
may be correct, but that is not for us to determine. Her 
disagreement is with the legislative policy decision about 
where the line should be drawn and "those disputes are not 
legally relevant under substantive due process 
jurisprudence." Id. at 647. 
 
2. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM. 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment "announces a fundamental principle: the State 
must govern impartially," New York Transit Authority v. 
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979), and "directs that `all 
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' " 
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Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)(quoting F.S. Royster 
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). Therefore, 
"[g]eneral rules that apply evenhandedly to all persons 
within the jurisdiction unquestionably comply" with the 
Equal Protection Clause. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587. Only 
when a state "adopts a rule that has a special impact on 
less than all persons subject to its jurisdiction" does a 
question arise as to whether the equal protection clause is 
violated. Id. at 587-88. 
 
However, the clause does not require that things which 
are different in fact be treated in law as though they are the 
same. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. "The initial discretion to 
determine what is `different' and what is `the same' resides 
in the legislatures of the States." Id. Accordingly, "the 
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of 
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of 
citizens differently than others." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420, 425 (1961). Therefore, "a statutory classification 
that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes 
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against 
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis 
for the classification." Federal Communications Comm. v. 
Beach, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).18  
 
Ms. Alexander argues that New Jersey's exclusion of the 
stillborn and fetuses from coverage under the wrongful 
death and survival acts creates two distinct classes.19 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Federal Communications Comm. v. Beach involved a challenge under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to a provision of the 
Cable Communications Policy Act by operators of satellite master 
antenna and television facilities. Because the Fifth Amendment imposes 
on the federal government the same standard required of state legislation 
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Schweiker 
v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n. 6 (1981), the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment has an "implied equal protection guarantee." Beach, 
508 U.S. at 312. 
 
19. Actually, Karen Alexander posits four classes. The first class is the 
largest class and is composed of all mothers who are pregnant. The 
second class is contained in the first class and is composed of pregnant 
mothers whose children sustain a prenatal injury. The third class is a 
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first class consists of all mothers whose injured fetuses are 
born but die as a result of the prenatal injury. The second 
class -- the Karen Alexander class -- consists of all 
mothers whose fetuses are tortiously injured in utero and 
die in the womb or are stillborn as a result. New Jersey law 
allows a wrongful death and survival action to mothers in 
the first class, but not to those in the second class. That 
much is not disputed; however, Ms. Alexander's argument 
fails because she also argues that there is no difference 
between the mothers in those two classes. She asserts that 
mothers in her class sustained "the same loss as other 
mothers to whom New Jersey gives the claim." Appellants' 
Brief, at 19. While that may be true insofar as it states the 
similarity between the respective tragedies, it is not true 
insofar as it attempts to foster a principle of Equal 
Protection jurisprudence. 
 
Ms. Alexander's Equal Protection claim parallels her Due 
Process claim in that she argues that New Jersey's 
classification affects fundamental rights, i.e., a mother's 
interest in her relationship with her child. However, as 
discussed earlier, Karen Alexander has not demonstrated 
how these statutes affect her relationship with her unborn 
child. Therefore, her own Equal Protection challenge is also 
entitled only to "rational basis" scrutiny. The rational basis 
standard is a "relatively relaxed standard reflecting the 
Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create 
distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an 
unavoidable one." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). Although New Jersey 
could have chosen to afford all mothers whose fetuses are 
injured a cause of action under the challenged statues, the 
wisdom of not doing so is not before us. It is the legality of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
subclass of the second class and consists of pregnant mothers whose 
children sustain a prenatal injury resulting in the death of a child after 
a live birth. The fourth class is also a subclass of the second class and 
is the Karen Alexander class composed of all pregnant mothers whose 
children sustain a prenatal injury and are stillborn. See Appellants' 
Brief, at 16-17. However, we do not think that delineating four classes 
is necessary for the purposes of this equal protection argument. It is the 
third and fourth classes which are significant here. 
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not doing so that we must decide, and we do not think the 
distinction that the state has drawn is illegal. 
 
 [R]ational basis review in equal protection analysis is 
not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, 
or logic of legislative choices. Nor does it authorize the 
judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge the 
wisdom or desirability of legislative policy 
determinations made in areas that affect neither 
fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines. 
For these reasons, a classification neither involving 
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines 
is accorded a strong presumption of validity. Such a 
classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection 
Clause if there is a rational relationship between 
the disparity of treatment and some legitimate 
governmental purpose. Further, a legislature that 
creates these categories need not actually articulate at 
any time the purpose or rationale supporting its 
classification. Instead, a classification must be upheld 
against equal protection challenge if there is any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide 
a rational basis for the classification. . . . 
 
 A statute is presumed constitutional . . . and the 
burden is on the one attacking the legislative 
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which 
might support it, whether or not the basis has a 
foundation in the record. Finally, courts are compelled 
under rational-basis review to accept a legislature's 
generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit 
between means and ends. A classification does not fail 
rational-basis review because it is not made with 
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in 
some inequality. The problems of government are 
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, 
rough accommodations -- illogical, it may be, and 
unscientific. 
 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993). The "standard 
of rationality . . . must find some footing in the realities of 
the subject addressed by the legislation." Id. at 321. Only 
when the classification "rests on grounds wholly irrelevant 
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to the achievement of the State's objectives" does a statute 
fail rational basis review. Id. at 323. 
 
Apparently, there is no legislative history to assist us in 
determining if the challenged statutes are rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest. However, the assumed 
legislative bases for the Wrongful Death Act were 
extensively discussed in Giardina v. Bennett. There, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed that statute and 
concluded that the legislature defined the wrongful death 
action with the intent of limiting it to the class of people 
considered persons by the common law. As noted earlier, 
the New Jersey legislature was doing nothing more than 
setting limits on tort recovery in those cases when a person 
is killed by the tortious conduct of another. Accordingly, we 
find no violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
D. THE CLAIM OF THE DRAZIN PLAINTIFFS. 
 
As noted above, Ms. Alexander's attorney and his law 
firm (the Drazin plaintiffs) also challenge these statutes. 
They allege a constitutional violation of their rights because 
they are precluded from bringing wrongful death and 
survival actions on behalf of Karen Alexander and other 
potential clients whose children were stillborn because of 
the wrongful acts of third parties. We are aware of no 
constitutional provision that creates a right in attorneys to 
bring lawsuits under the circumstances involved here. 
Moreover, the district court quite properly concluded that 
Ms. Alexander is the party best suited to challenge these 
statutes and held that the Drazin plaintiffs lack standing. 
See Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
In Wilentz, we noted that an inquiry into standing also 
encompasses prudential considerations. 
 
Where a plaintiff asserting third party standing has 
suffered concrete, redressable injury (that is, the 
plaintiff has Article III standing), federal courts are to 
examine at least three additional factual elements 
before allowing the suit to proceed. First, the court 
must examine the relationship between the plaintiff 
and the third party whose rights are asserted; second, 
the court must consider the ability of the third party to 
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advance its own rights -- whether some obstacle 
impedes the rightholder's own suit; and third, the 
court must inquire into the impact on third party 
interests -- whether the plaintiff and the third party 
have consistent interests. 
 
952 F.2d at 749 (citations omitted). We added that a court 
may consider other "factors [that] may also be relevant to 
the ultimate prudential consideration." Id. at 750. The 
nature of the claim asserted by the Drazin plaintiffs would 
fall woefully short of these considerations even if it 
comported with the more formal "case and controversy" 
components of Article III standing. Indeed, whatever loss 
the Drazin plaintiffs may assert here is reduced to such 
insignificance (if not absurdity) by Ms. Alexander's tragic 
loss that we can not help but wonder how the Drazin 
plaintiffs can seriously challenge the district court's ruling 
as to their lack of standing. Moreover, since we conclude 
that there is no constitutional violation here, the Drazin 




In concluding, we wish to stress that we do not intend 
minimize the immensity of Ms. Alexander's tragic loss. Any 
parent would appreciate that it is of monumental 
proportion. However, our task is to apply those principles 
that control and guide legal analysis and thereby determine 
if the district court erred in dismissing the suit that was 
brought under section 1983. Though we understand how a 
parent would conclude that the interests at stake here are 
fundamental, that is not the test we must apply. 
"Fundamental interests" in constitutional adjudication are 
not equivalent to general interests of "particular human or 
societal significance." Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 93 (3d 
Cir. 1983)(citing San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 33 (1973). Rather, fundamental interests are those 
which "have their source, explicitly or implicitly, in the 
Constitution." Id. (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.15 (1982). 
 
For the reasons set forth above we hold that Ms. 
Alexander has failed to establish that New Jersey's 
limitation on wrongful death and survival actions is 
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unconstitutional, and we therefore affirm the judgment of 
the district court. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I am in almost complete agreement with the court's 
opinion, but I write to comment briefly on two points. First, 
I think that the court's suggestion that there could be 
"human beings" who are not "constitutional persons" (Maj. 
Op. 14-15) is unfortunate. I agree with the essential point 
that the court is making: that the Supreme Court has held 
that a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the reference to 
constitutional non-persons, taken out of context, is capable 
of misuse. 
 
Second, I think that our substantive due process inquiry 
must be informed by history. It is therefore significant that 
at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and for many years thereafter, the right to recover for injury 
to a stillborn child was not recognized. See Giardina v. 
Bennett, 545 A.2d 139, 143 (N.J. 1988); Smith v. Brennan, 
157 A.2d 497, 498 (N.J. 1960). 
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